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Abstract. The proposed spam filtering architecture for MTA1 servers is a 
component based architecture that allows distributed processing and centralized 
knowledge. This architecture allows heterogeneous systems to coexist and 
benefit from a centralized knowledge source and filtering rules. MTA servers in 
the infrastructure contribute to a common knowledge, allowing for a more 
rational resource usage. The architecture is fully scalable, ranging from all-in-
one system with minimal components instances, to multiple components 
instances distributed across multiple systems. Filtering rules can be 
implemented as independent modules that can be added, removed or modified 
without impact on MTA servers operation. A proof-of-concept solution was 
developed. Most of spam is filtered due to a grey-listing effect from the 
architecture itself. Using simple filters as Domain Name System black and 
white lists, and Sender Policy Framework validation, it is possible to guarantee 
a spam filtering effective, efficient and virtually without false positives. 
Keywords: spam filtering, distributed architecture, component based, 
centralized knowledge, heterogeneous system, scalable deployment, dynamic 
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1   Introduction 
Internet mail spam2 is a problem for most organizations and individuals. Receiving 
spam on mobile devices, and on other connected appliances, is yet a bigger problem, 
as these platforms are not the most appropriate for spam filtering. 
Spam can be seen as belonging to one of two major categories: Fraud and 
Commercial. In the fraud category we include phishing, scams, malware, counterfeit 
products, and any other criminal activities perpetrated or assisted through Internet 
mail. In the commercial category we include promotional messages – such as 
newsletters – that we do not want to receive, either being sent legally or illegally3 
from legitimate organizations. We can also classify these two categories as per threat 
and per volume [1], as shown in Table 1. 
                                                          
1 MTA – Mail Transfer Agent, commonly referred as mail server. 
2 For this paper, spam is defined as every message that most people do not want to receive. 
3 At the European Community countries all commercial mail messages are opt-in, that is to say 
that it is illegal to send commercial messages without prior consent from the receiver. 
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Table 1.  Category classification. 
Category Threat Volume 
Fraud High High 
Commercial Low Low 
 
So, we should primarily address the spam messages in the fraud category. 
What is an efficient – and still effective – solution for this spam filtering? 
Can an architecture, that enables filtering based on the source of spam, be both 
efficient and effective? Designing and implementing a proof-of-concept for such an 
architecture, should provide us with enough statistical data to find an answer. 
2   Relationship to Internet of Things 
The usefulness of information platforms, specially of mobile devices and connected 
appliances, depends largely on the relevance of the information they provide. The 
spam received in these platforms wastes resources4, and reduces the overall relevancy 
of the information provided. 
The proposed spam filtering solution is a scalable and distributed architecture that 
allows the construction of an ecosystem composed by connected heterogeneous 
systems to collaborate for a common knowledge. This common knowledge provides a 
more rational use of resources, as it allows a simple and fast decision to be taken at 
each MTA and, at the same time, it prevents the duplication of complex decisions as 
these are based on a common source of information. This solution reduces waste and 
improves the relevancy of the information provided. 
3   Traditional Solutions 
Traditional and common solutions for spam filtering can be found in two flavours: 
client and server side. 
Client-side solutions – that reject or obfuscate messages – must  be avoided, as in 
these cases the sender cannot be properly informed, becoming a major problem for 
any false positives that might occur. And it is inefficient, as the server uses resources 
to process and store spam, and the client to receive it. 
Most common server-side solutions, such as the Spamassassin [2], are monolithic 
and run a synchronous filtering process. This is highly inefficient, as each connection 
is kept active until a complex decision process is complete. On busy servers this 
might end in a Denial of Service (DoS). It is even more inefficient when an incoming 
connection, from a previously blocked source, triggers the same process again in any 
MTA of the infrastructure, due to the lack of a common knowledge. 
Approaches have been made to spam filtering architectures, yet they focus more on 
effectiveness of spam identification, rather than on filtering efficiency. Ma, et al. [3] 
propose an architecture for content normalization, to improve content analysis. 
                                                          
4 Such as CPU, bandwidth, connections, storage, and others related to energy consumption. 
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Cottereau [4] proposes a collaborative architecture for client-side filtering. Yih, et al. 
[5] also propose a method for increasing the effectiveness of spam identification. 
4   The Architecture 
In order to save resources5, we need to make a decision as soon as possible, and this 
means to start our filtering process as soon as a connection is established to an MTA. 
Also, we must avoid client-side bounces, as the mail addresses from senders may 
be forged, and we would be assisting the spammer by spamming innocent victims. In 
this respect, server rejections are safe, as these are reported to the MTA of the sender 
and not to any eventually forged mail address. It is vital to inform the sender of a 
rejection, so that false positives do not go unnoticed, thus giving the chance to a 
legitimate sender to find a way to bypass any false positive rejection that might occur. 
So, the present architectural solution is designed to operate in mail servers (MTA). 
4.1   Working Principle 
The working principle of the architecture is a quite simple and straightforward one. It 
is roughly divided into three main areas and five components, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Areas and working Components. 
Areas Components 
Decision Adapter + Proxy 
Information Knowledge 
Assessment Consultant + Agent 
 
A decision process is initiated by the MTA, and its goal is to process each SMTP 
[6] command and decide to either accept or reject the SMTP session or transaction 
based on available information. When the information is insufficient to make a 
reliable decision, the MTA returns a temporary fail, and that fact gets registered. 
The information is a set of data classified in order to allow a quick and reliable 
decision. Unclassified data is processed by an assessment to obtain the proper 
classification. The type of data to consider should provide reliable identification, such 
as an IP address of an MTA, or a mail domain. Mail addresses can also be considered 
for a type of data for identification purposes, although they can easily be forged, as 
long as this fact is kept in mind. The classification should be easy to interpret as a 
simple rule to reject (dark, black), accept (light, white), or as insufficient to make a 
decision and thus issue a temporary fail (grey). 
An assessment process runs at regular intervals, checking if insufficient 
information was found by a decision process. If there is such an event, an assessment 
is made, in order to obtain a reliable classification (dark or light) for what was 
previously insufficient information (grey). 
                                                          
5 Including human resources, whose time is spent with irrelevant information (spam). 
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4.2   Architecture Components 
The components of the architecture allow a distributed environment with a centralized 
source of information. Fig. 1 shows a possible deployment for the components of the 
architecture, where the dashed lines denote a tight coupling between components, and 
full lines denote a loose coupling (network connection). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Diagram of the proposed Architecture. 
 
The Adapter component allows heterogeneous MTA systems to coexist, and to 
benefit from a common and central source of information, to which every MTA 
contributes. This enhances the performance of the system and the rationalization of 
the resources, as it avoids duplicate assessments. It accesses the solution services 
through the Proxy component. A simple API is provided to enable this access. 
The Proxy component is the decision centre, based on the Knowledge. 
The Knowledge component gathers data into a database that can be used for 
informed decision making – by the Proxy – and for statistical purposes. 
The Consultant component is responsible for regularly checking the Knowledge for 
information that requires classification, and to invoke the appropriate Agents that are 
able to properly classify that information. 
The Agent component acts upon advice from a Consultant, and provides the proper 
classification as a response to an information query asked by the Consultant. 
5   Results 
A proof-of-concept solution was developed to assess the architecture efficiency and 
effectiveness. The developed Adapter was for the Sendmail MTA implementation. 
The Proxy – and associated API – were developed to allow communication only 
through IPC (Inter-Process Communication), instead of networked communications. 
Yet, the developed solution allows for a full analysis and assessment of the 
architecture on both effectiveness and efficiency. 
The whole solution was developed using only Open Source technologies. The test 
environment was a single CentOS 5 system running a Sendmail MTA server. The 
Adapter and Proxy components – as the Proxy API – were developed in C. A MySQL 
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relational database was used for the Knowledge component. The PERL language was 
used for the Consultant and Agent components. Hardware wise, as it is important to 
assess the efficiency, the Internet connection was assured by an ADSL link of roughly 
10 Mbps downstream and 700 Kbps upstream, and the whole software services (plus 
others like HTTP and DNS) ran on an ATOM D525@1.8GHz processor machine 
with 2 GB of memory. 
Data was collected for two months. For this period of over sixty days6, at the test 
server, it was recorded: 
 6,793 distinct source IP addresses 
 14,282 distinct mail addresses (both sender and receiver) 
 23,194 connections, of which: 
◦ 17,564 reached the envelope phase (sender identification) 
◦ 2,544 reached the recipient phase 
5.1   Effectiveness 
 
Being an implementation of a proof-of-concept, only one filtering Agent was 
developed for the Consultant. This developed Agent checks DNS lists – both black 
and white – for an MTA host IP address. 
Yet, the architecture has a grey-listing effect, which acts as an additional filter. 
This happens because, when a source MTA is not yet classified (as to reject or to 
accept) at the central common Knowledge component, the Proxy instructs the MTA to 
return a temporary failure, to delay the reception until the Consultant assesses and 
classifies the required information. The delay time depends on the frequency set for 
the Consultant to run, plus the assessment duration, and the settings of the sender 
MTA for retry attempts. 
In Fig. 2a we can understand why this grey-listing effect is effective to filter fraud 
spam, as most connections are from IP addresses that do not host real MTA servers 
and so they do not retry, ending with just one single connection established from that 
source IP address. We can also conclude, from Fig. 2b, that most legitimate messages 
(light) come from a low amount of new IP addresses7, and that spam (dark) come 
from a large number of different IP addresses. This is consistent with spam being sent 
from zombie computers of spam botnets. 
 
                                                          
6 The first couple of days, and the last day of the recorded 66 days of data are incomplete. 
7 Should be even less than the amount shown, as these numbers include – most certainly – IP 
addresses that are in fact source of spam but were not in any of the DNS lists used. 
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 (a) Connections by Host (b) New Hosts per Day 
Fig. 2. Distribution of Host Connections. 
As it can be seen in Fig. 3, one of the DNS black lists (Spamhaus), used by the 
single implemented Agent, was able to identify 5,909 IP addresses as a source of 
spam from the 6,793 distinct source IP addresses from which connections were 
established to the testing MTA used. This accounts for over 85% of the sources. 
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Fig. 3. DNS Lists Effectiveness . 
As most spam in the fraud category has faked mail addresses, adding an Agent for 
SPF [7] validation to the solution would guarantee an even higher effectiveness of the 
solution. 
Considering that over 50% of fraud spam is caught by the grey-listing effect, that a 
single DNS black list can detect 85% of the remaining messages, and that the others 
DNS black lists can increase this detection ratio, then it is possible to expect a virtual 
full detection of fraud spam just by adding an SPF filtering Agent. 
False positives (FP) are not an issue, up to this point, even with SPF filtering 
added. Those FP that might result from DNS black lists can be reversed by the usage 
of white lists. The FP resulting from SPF and grey-listing are due to poor server 
configurations, and those systems administrators should properly configure their 
systems following the RFC directives. Besides, FP are always properly addressed, 
meaning that the sender will always be notified of a rejection, allowing for an 
alternative form of communication, or by correcting the system configuration. 
5.2   Efficiency 
The architecture allows spam filtering to occur asynchronously, and this is important 
to the solution efficiency. Not only it relieves the MTA server from a longer waiting 
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period of validations – spam filtering rules and associated procedures – as it only 
validates one single instance of each data across all MTA in the ecosystem, being it 
from several instances at the same MTA or from different MTA. 
As the Proxy component only makes a decision to accept, reject or temporarily fail 
a connection based on a simple common local knowledge (as the source MTA IP 
address, or senders domain and IP as in SPF), the MTA server takes little time and 
effort to make a decision. This can be seen in Fig. 4a, where almost 50% of the 
connections took less than one second to process, and almost 95% took less than two 
seconds. 
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 (a) Proxy Performance  (b) Consultant Performance  
Fig. 4. Performance . 
 
On the other hand, the Consultant component, as it uses Agents that can have 
complex filtering procedures, or that check external services subject to delays, may 
take a lot longer to classify a source as spam or ham8, as it can be seen in Fig. 4b, 
where almost 60% of the DNS list verifications took 10 seconds to conclude. 
So, considering a monolithic solution with a synchronous decision process, where 
the MTA would need to wait for the filtering process, just to consult DNS black lists 
would increase each MTA connection duration from an average below one second to 
one almost 8 seconds long, as it can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Processing Times (in seconds). 
Component Minimum Average Maximum 
Proxy 0 0.7473 74 
Consultant 0 7.1089 12 
6   Conclusions and Further Developments 
It came as a bit of a good surprise that this architecture alone, without any help from a 
filtering Agent, could be responsible for filtering most messages in the fraud category. 
The temporary fail, imposed when no data is available to make an informed decision, 
has a grey-listing effect that prevents most spam originated from botnets of zombies 
computers, as most only tries once to send the spam. 
                                                          
8 Ham is said to be the opposite of spam, which is to say a wanted message. 
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The IP addresses DNS lists (both black and white) filtering Agent, the only one 
implemented in the proof-of-concept, was able to identify over 85% of the IP source 
addresses as being a source of spam. An implementation of an SPF filtering Agent 
would most certainly fill the gap for messages in the fraud category. 
On the downside, we have a more complex solution due to its many disperse 
components. Thus, faults due to communication failures are more prone to occur, and 
security constitutes a major concern. These issues must be addressed with extreme 
care, as the reliability of the solution depends largely on them. 
The final conclusion is that the architecture fulfilled the objectives. It greatly 
improves spam filtering processing performance, and has an impressive effectiveness 
record, even with so scarce development of Agent components, dubbed as filtering 
rules and procedures. With a good set of filtering Agents, it can achieve an excellent 
record at spam identification. On top of this, we can run the solution in heterogeneous 
systems, sharing efforts and information, and scale the distributed system to match the 
traffic volume of mail messages. 
Further developments most certainly will include the development of new Agents, 
such as SPF filtering and trap mail addresses. Yet, the logs recorded will allow a more 
detailed spam profiling, and this analysis should be used to develop other Agents that 
will increase effectiveness without any loss of efficiency. Also, this server-side 
filtering can be combined with a client-side filtering that can contribute to the 
common central Knowledge, and with other forms of filtering. 
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